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Traces and transformation
Kenneth

Gergen

My attempt in what follows is to offer an intellectual history in which Berger
and Luckmann's classic work has played a pivotal role. While this early
work is no longer central to this story, its major thesis ultimately served as
a conceptual catalyst for an intellectual transformation of major propor
tion. It is the stages of this transformation I wish to illuminate. Admittedly
my account cannot be separated from my position as an American social
scientist, confronted with a particular configuration of challenges and in
fluences. However, the intellectual developments at issue have grown in
significance, now moving globally; multiple perspectives are essential for
gaining understanding and appreciation.1 In the following account I first
consider, then, the controversial intellectual climate into which the Berger
and Luckmann treatise arrived. Here their work played a key role in the
shift from a foundationalist philosophic to a social account of science. In
the subsequent stage, the rapidly accumulating scholarship in critical and
literary domains began to undermine the assumptions of the social account,
including those undergirding the Berger and Luckmann formulation. Ul
timately emerging from these dialogues was an orientation to knowledge
described as reflective pragmatism. In a third stage, a major shift occurred
from attempts to ground a social epistemology to constructionism as a dis
course of practice. Here we find an enormous range of professional practices
inspired by constructionist discourse. Finally, I consider the way in which
constructionist ideas opened a space for imaginative and ideologically sen
sitive theoretical departures. I conclude with a discussion of a newly emerg
ing, relational conception of human action, one presaged by Berger and
Luckmann, but now opening entirely new vistas of inquiry.

The gathering storm: the end of fou.ndationalism
The English translation of Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construc
tion of Reality, published in 1966, arrived in a period of intellectual and
cultural upheaval. Indeed, the conditions of the times formed the very
context that imparted such significance to the work. 2 Of particular im
portance is that in both the United States and Europe, there was growing
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antagonism - particularly among the younger generations - toward the es
tablished structures of society. There were many reasons for the strikes and
demonstrations of the times, but a primary target of critique was what was
largely perceived as an unjust war in Vietnam. The scientific establishment
was included in this critique, especially as its claim to ideological neutrality
seemed disingenuous. Science seemed essentially serving as a handmaiden
to military and societal control. The adulation enjoyed by science - the apex
of modernity - was eroding. Likewise, logical empiricist philosophy of sci
ence, which had provided the foundations for both the natural sciences and
the newly developing array of social sciences, became the subject of increas
ing skepticism. The critiques of Wittgenstein (1953) and Quine (1960) were
among the most crippling.
It was under these conditions that an opening developed for an alterna
tive to the philosophically based logical empiricist account of science. The
ground had been laid for a fu]ly social theory of science by sociologists such
as Durkheim (1915) and Mannheim (1985 [1936]). But it was the 1962 publi
cation of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that was to
carry the banner of transformation. Partly owing to its title - echoing the
revolutionary spirit of the times - and partly to its rhetorical brilliance, the
work became a major catalyst of critical reflection. As Kuhn demonstrated,
what had been viewed as linear scientific progress in physics was not the
result of increasingly accurate measures of the world, but a shift in par
adigms of understanding. These paradigms were constituted primarily by
agreements among enclaves of scientists in the assumptions that informed
their inquiry. A shift in assumptions could bring into focus a new way of
observing, understanding and making claims to knowledge. In bolder form,
scientific knowledge is not driven by observation, but observation is driven
by social interchange. Controversy was intense, and the scholarly outpour
ing enormous.
It was into this controversy that the Berger and Luckmann volume ar
rived. The work was of signal significance for, unlike Kuhn, it offered a
sophisticated and richly elaborated account of the social process out of
which reality claims emerged. It also buttressed the arguments in the his
tory of science - of which Kuhn was a part - with extensive deliberation
in the sociology of knowledge. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, was
the title of the work. Cadres of scholars from across the social sciences
and the humanities were exploring the potentials of a social (as opposed
to philosophical) view of science. Yet, there was no overarching term or
phrase that united these efforts. Owing to the broad scope of the Berger
and Luckmann volume, their choice of the phrase "social construction,"
proved prescient. It enabled scholars from across disparate communities
to recognize, appreciate and integrate the work of others. And it was this
very breakdown in disciplinary restrictions that enabled diverse move
ments to unite in a major transformation in the concept and practice of
knowledge-making.
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Radical emancipation: the end of knowing
While scholarly contributions to a social account of scientific knowledge
have continued unabated, they have been accompanied by two other intel
lectual movements of substantial scope. These movements - emphasizing
ideological critique and literary artifice - have both augmented the social
view of science while simultaneously undermining the assumptions on
which it rests. To put it differently, they have expanded the scope of a social
constructionist vision, but transformed its premises.
To expand, the ideological critique of knowledge claims gained prominence
in the 1930s' emergence of the Frankfurt School writings of Horkheimer,
Adorno and Marcuse (Tarr 2011). Their critiques were both novel and un
settling as they thrust into question claims to knowledge, not in terms of
evidence, but of their underlying ideology. This form of argument was eas
ily grafted onto the social account of science, as it suggested (to use Kuhn's
terms) that the paradigms framing any given research project could be both
ideological and politically freighted. Thus, lines of social inquiry were stimu
lated that illuminated, for example, the gender biases inherent in both biology
(Martin 1987) and physics (Longino 1990). With Foucault's (1980) writings on
the ways in which knowledge claims subtly affect relations of power, the span
of critical analysis was dramatically expanded. Minority groups from across
the spectrum (e.g., African American, feminist, gay and lesbian), along with
advocates for various social causes (e.g., environmentalist, anti-psychiatry,
economic equality), were furnished with a means of challenging empirical
knowledge claims with a logic that could not convincingly be refuted.3
While Berger and Luckmann made note of the important place of lan
guage in their sociology of knowledge, their formulation was scarcely pre
pared for the ferment occurring in the fields of literary theory and rhetorical
studies. In both cases, scholars went on to demonstrate the extent to which
scientific accounts of the world are not so much dependent upon or driven
by the world in itself, as they are on our discursive conventions (Goodman
1978; McClosky 1985). Regardless of "the way the world is," we must rely
on circumscribed traditions of language to describe and explain this world.
Both the critical and the literary/rhetorical movements added substantial
scope and power to the social accounts of knowledge. At the same time, how
ever, they undermined the premises upon which these accounts were based.
The problem was most acute in the social studies of science, because virtu
ally all such analyses employed empirical data to justify their conclusions. If
such data could not adequately provide the grounds for truth claims in the
sciences, they could not then be used to justify their own proposals. Further,
one might properly inquire into the ideological and political investments
of such accounts. Did they not represent liberal and anti-establishment in
terests? And finally, were the social accounts themselves not linguistically
circumscribed and rhetorically fashioned? Is social construction itself not a
social construction?
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With these two intellectual laminations added to the social account of
knowledge, the premises of the Berger and Luckmann (1966) thesis could
scarcely be sustained. As Berger and Luclcmann had concluded, "our con
ception of the sociology of knowledge [...] does not imply that [it] is not a
science, that its methods should be other than empirical, or that it cannot
be 'value-free"' (p. 189). Now impugned, however, were both the status of
empirical fact and the possibility of ideologically uninflected theory.4 More
generally, these additional lines of argument essentially threw into question
the entire modernist project: The presumption that the application of astute
reasoning, combined with systematic observation, could provide continu
ous progress toward the goals of mastery, well-being and survival. Through
reasoning itself, reason lost its command.

From impasse to outcome: the pragmatic tum
These three intellectual movements - the social account of science, critical
studies and the literary/rhetorical movement - converge into what may be
termed the social constructionist dialogues. Together they have virtually
eliminated foundationalist philosophy of science from the contemporary
agenda in philosophy. At the same time, they have undermined interest in
establishing foundations for an alternative epistemology - including the so
cial constructionist. The Cartesian dream of an inclusive rational frame
work for directing action lost its momentum; in Berger and Luckmann's
terms, claims to knowledge - regardless of origins - could no longer be le
gitimized. And, because the teeth were simultaneously removed from crit
ical analysis (unable to justify its own critique), one could begin to see the
demise of the social constructionist dialogues themselves. Interestingly, the
reverse occurred: Constructionist-informed initiatives increased in vitality.
The sources of this explosion in activity might be traced to the contri
butions of Wittgenstein, Foucault and John Dewey to the constructionist
dialogues, and particularly to their strong pragmatist leanings. If one aban
doned the quest for foundationalist metatheory, logic or legitimation, there
still remained the question of the resulting outcomes. What is achieved by
virtue of a given standpoint, paradigm, theory, empirical study or construc
tion of the world? What doors to action are opened; what is no longer per
mitted; what forms of life do we create or subvert? Put in these terms, all
traditional forms of knowledge-making could be resuscitated. Traditional
empirical work could be honored (or not) depending on what such research
contributed (or not) to the world. And further, all those voices marginalized
by the dominant order now had a place in the agora of reality-making. What
could they offer, how would these offerings play out for our future? This did
not mean an "anything goes" mentality; indeed, the criteria of acceptability
were multiplied. For what constitutes a useful contribution in one enclave,
may be deeply oppressive in many others. The rights to reality were open
to all, but so were the rights to moral, political or ideological resistance.

Traces and transformation 263
In short, emerging from the constructionist dialogues was a general orien
tation of reflective pragmatis (cf. Gergen 2015a). The concern with societal
outcomes was already evidenced in much critical work, oriented as it was to
liberating readers from taken-for-granted assumptions. The outpouring of
books and articles beginning with the phase "The social construction of. .."
has been continuous, with targets including mental health, geography, sexu
ality, race, homicide, gender, age, deviance, the theory of evolution, among
many others. Yet, many professionals found means of employing construc
tionist ideas to transform practices more directly. Two illustrations are il
luminating: First is the virtual explosion of research methods or practices
in the social sciences. Empiricist foundationalism had come to dominate
20th-century social science. As a result, all those orientations that differed
in assumptions - such as phenomenology, psychoanalysis, ethnography
and participatory action research - were either disparaged, suppressed or
eliminated. The focus of research was radically narrowed to prediction and
control, with experimental methodology and statistical analysis considered
the gold standard. With the development and expansion of constructionist
ideas, the rationale for such restrictions evaporated.
Nurtured especially by the critical work of feminist, gay and lesbian, hu
manist and African American enclaves, there was increased motivation to
develop alternatives. Traditional claims to value neutrality seem disingenu
ous, and the manipulative and distancing practices of experimental research
smacked of exploitation. How else could inquiry proceed? First, this meant
a revival in a range of the otherwise marginalized practice. Feminists also
began to develop a range of research practices congenial with an ethic of
caring (Gilligan 1982). Constructionist researchers launched a new range
of research practices, including narrative study, discourse analysis and
conversation analysis among them. The focus on the place of narrative in
constructing worlds stimulated enormous range of inquiry - spanning the
humanities and the social sciences. Most importantly, with the traditional
strictures now removed, a space was opened for the imagination to soar. The
result was a plethora of newly minted practices - auto-ethnography, portrai
ture, critical hermeneutics, visual methodology, online ethnography, crea
tive nonfiction and arts-based research (cf. e.g., Denzin and Lincoln 2005).
Collectively, these many forms of practice are placed under the rubric
of qualitative inquiry, in contrast to the quantitative methods preferred
in the empiricist tradition. However, the label is misleading in two senses:
First, many of the newly emerging practices have made use of empiricist as
sumptions (e.g., value neutrality, independent subject matter, subject/object
dichotomy). Much that appears under the banner of qualitative inquiry
is simply empiricism without numbers. Second, there are substantial dif
ferences among the various qualitative practices in terms of assumptions,
values and pragmatic interests. Most interesting from a constructionist
standpoint, however, is that while vast differences prevail, there is relative
equanimity in terms of relationships among enclaves. As Wertz (2011) has
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put it, the qualitative movement is essentially pluralist in character. Mutual
openness prevails. In effect, without a metatheoretical foundation, there are
no grounds for mutual dismissiveness.
These innovations in the practice of social inquiry are currently changing
the character of social science. However, there is a second significant illus
tration of the constructionist-based shift toward pragmatic outcomes. Es
pecially relevant to the continuing significance of the Berger and Ludemann
thesis is the metamorphosis of constructionist ideas from a theory of knowl
edge to a discourse of practice. From a metatheoretical perspective, fields
of study such as physics, chemistry, economics, literary study and so on can
be viewed as communities of practice. At the same time, there is an active
and expanding community of practice in which the social constructionist
vocabulary plays a central role. Constructionist ideas essentially constitute
a vocabulary ofpractice. Here, both scholars and practitioners explore ways
of using the vocabulary in their research, creative theorizing and innova
tions in practice. A significant illustration is furnished by developments
in the therapeutic world. The traditional orientation to psychotherapy is
based on assumptions borrowed from medicine. That is, bizarre behavior
and intense anguish are constructed as "illnesses," for which psychotherapy
should furnish a "cure." The result over time has been the development of an
enormous classification system for mental illness (as represented in succes
sive volumes of the DSM), the dissemination of mental health information
to the general public, and institutional requirements for assigning labels to
those providing help. The results of these efforts, now spanning a century, is
that the number of people defined as mentally ill has continuously increased
(now numbering more than 1 in 10 in the United States), and the amount
spent on psychotropic drugs has entered into the multibillions of dollars. As
constructionists argue, the very use of mental illness terms to define people
with personal problems leads them to construct themselves in these terms,
thus expanding the dependence on therapists and psychotropic drugs.
The outpouring of constructionist critique of deficit discourse has been a
significant precursor to a creative and far-reaching search for alternatives.
Drawing from the constructionist dialogues, Michael White and David
Epston (1990) developed the concept and practice of narrative therapy.
"Problems" on this account do not reside in the individual mind, but within
the individual's narrative. The therapeutic challenge is thus to work toward
transforming the narrative. In the same way, a range of brief therapies and
strength-based therapies (de Shazer 1994) shift the focus of conversation
from what the individual lacks or is anguished about, to positive potentials.
Collaborative therapies (Anderson & Gehart 2006), in turn, emphasize
the power of joining with clients in searching for more viable life forms.
All these practices avoid using diagnostic categories; all center on ways of
reconstructing reality. In related initiatives, Tom Andersen (1991) and his
colleagues have developed the practice of reflecting teams, that is, teams of
therapists who offer clients multiple ways of understanding their condition
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and potentials. Jakko Seikkula and his Finnish colleagues (Seikkula &
Arnkil 2006) have developed the practice of dialogic meetings as a means
of subverting the process of "expert diagnosis." In the initial consultation,
multiple parties share their views of "the problem" and potential directions
for action. Client difficulties are ameliorated with help from their families,
friends, teachers, coworkers and others, including medical personnel, social
workers and therapists. Dialogic meetings have succeeded in reducing the
number of patients in mental hospitals and lowering dependency on drugs.
These developments in the therapeutic world are simply illustrations of cre
ative endeavors across a vast spectrum. In the world of organizational devel
opment, for example, constructionist-informed practices have given rise to
an entirely new way of transforming organizations. Rather than studying the
organization, and using the results of empirical study or strategic planning,
innovators focus on "changing the conversations" within the organization
(Bushe & Marshak 2015). As participants co-construct the meaning, val
ues and activities of the organization, so they can generate routes to change
(Cooperrider & Whitney 2005). In education, scholars and practitioners have
relied on constructionist ideas to transform pedagogy, curricula, school ad
ministration and school culture (Dragonas et al. 2015; Lewis & Winkelman
2016). In the area of healthcare, we find constructionist ideas emerging in prac
tices of collaborative medicine, hospital reorganization and doctor-patient
relations (Charon 2006; Uhlig & Raboin 2015). In peace-building, construc
tionist ideas have stimulated the development of new practices for travers
ing boundaries of understanding (Herzig & Chasin 2005; Winslade & Monk
2008). Additional contributions of constructionist ideas to practice may be
found in practical theology (Hermans et al. 2002), geography (Henderson &
Waterstone 2009), economics (Granovetter 1992), social work (Witkin 2011),
counseling (Monk et al. 2007) and nursing (Kelly & Symonds 2003).5
It should be noted that one of the major reasons for constructionist ideas
having been so important to communities of practice lies in their implicit
optimism. Fields of study like sociobiology, neuroscience and experimen
tal psychology are based on the presumption of a fundamental human
nature. Human patterns of selfishness, aggression, racism, philandering,
power-seeking and so on are locked into our biological system. For construc
tionists, however, these very constructions of the world are inimical in their
consequences. They invite a conservative posture: "After all, there is no way
you can change human nature." For constructionists, human action largely
emerges from social negotiation. As we come to agree on what is real, moral,
rational or worthwhile, we fashion our patterns of acceptable activity. In this
context, the potential for change is as close at hand as the next conversation.

Reconstrncting the social: the relational turn
As just discussed, the constructionist dialogues have had a liberating effect
on forms of inquiry in the social sciences. A pluralist orientation toward
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research is pervasive. This same spirit of liberation has also entered the do
main of theory. With the increasing domination of empiricist foundational
ism in the social sciences, the status of theory had diminished. After all, it
was argued, a theoretical proposal without supporting evidence was mere
armchair speculation. In effect, theory should serve a summary, integrating
function, a means of drawing together empirical findings into a coherent
whole. The constructionist dialogues struck a major blow to this inductivist
view, in demonstrating how a socially negotiated fore-structure of under
standing was essential to carrying out research at all. Without a world of
constructed realities, there was nothing to study. In this context, creative
theoretical work is at a premium. As new worlds are opened theoretically,
there are also new ways of seeing and new routes to action.
To illustrate the impact of this line of reasoning, I wish to focus on a sin
gle but highly significant development in theory, one that is directly stimu
lated by the constructionist dialogues themselves. To set the context, one of
the chief problems confronted in the Berger and Luckmann treatise inheres
in their concept of social life. At the outset, they draw from two separate
traditions of discourse. On the one hand, Berger and Luckmann draw from
the individualist legacy in Western culture, that is, a conception of society
composed of single individuals, each living in a subjective world. At the
same time, they draw from the more recent, macro-sociological legacy in
which the concept of society (or social structures) is essentially what Berger
and Luckmann, posit as an "objective reality." Neither of these legacies,
alone or in combination, offers a viable conception of social life, a concep
tion that permits an understanding of the origins of social life. If there is to
be a social life, how does it become organized; how does it change (or not)
over time; how are we to account for conflict? Such questions would seem to
require a viable account of communication.
With respect to the individualist conception, it has remained impossible
for scholars to solve the problem of communication. How is it that one's sub
jective world can be understood by another? This has been a problem not only
for those attempting to develop forms of verstehende Psychologie but also for
several centuries of hermeneutical philosophy. Berger and Luckmann (1966)
speak of this process in terms of a "taking over" of the world of others. But
how this occurs remains mysterious. They speak only of a "complex form
of internalization" in which "I not only 'understand' the other's momentary
subjective processes, I 'understand' the world in which he lives, and that
world becomes my own" (p. 130). We are still left, then, with the major her
meneutic conundrum of how we can adequately draw judgments about pri
vate meanings from public display, when we have no means of knowing how
these realms are connected, nor the ability to verify a judgment save through
further display (for further discussion, see Gergen 1994a).
The sociological legacy offers no panacea for this problem as communi
cation is a process that we conceptualize as taking place within a society and
its structures. It is communication that enables a social group or structure
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to become solidified and identified as such. In effect, macro-sociology must
presuppose a relationship among its units in order to realize intelligibility.6
Yet there does remain a further alternative to theorizing the social world
and the potential for communication. If we remove individual subjectivity
from the center of analysis, along with macro-social entities, there remains
an alternative largely underdeveloped within the historical context of Berger
and Luckmann's writings. This is the discourse of the micro-social world,
lying between the macro and the individual.
To be sure, there were intellectual stirrings available at the time of Berger
and Luckmann's treatise. There was first a range of symbolic interactionist
writings, with George Herbert Mead's Mind, Self and Society preeminent.
As Mead proposed, there is no thinking, or indeed any sense of being a self,
that is, independent of relations with others. For Mead (1934),
No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and others,
since our own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in
so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such in our experience
also.
(p. 164)
Also available was the expanding dialogue that came to be identified as re
lational psychoanalysis. There had long been discontent with Freud's rel
ative inattention to social as opposed to psychodynamics. However, the
most concerted attempt to shift the focus to social dynamics emerged in
the object relations movement of the 1950s. In this case, theorists variously
reasoned that the individual's fundamental drives are more social than
pleasure-seeking in their aims. Thus, relational processes move onto center
stage from childhood into adult years. In the hands of analysts such as
Fairbairn, Mahler and Klein, the focus turned to the origins and dynamics
of subjective interrelationships.7
While these and other entries into a micro-social understanding of social
life were available as theoretical resources, they were also flawed. They all
sustained the impasse of mind/world dualism.8 How can one mental world
grasp, penetrate or comprehend the mental world of another? It is this im
passe that gave way in the decades following the publication of Berger and
Luckmann's prominent work. This transformation in micro-social theoriz
ing can be traced to three specific movements in the social constructionist
dialogues. First, as described earlier, there was the liberation of the imagi
nation sparked by constructionist scholarship. The theoretical exploration
of the micro-social world stood as an open and yet to be explicated door.
Second, a pointed reason for entering this door emerged from the critical
movement in constructionism. For a wide range of critics, Western individ
ualism became a prime target for critical reflection. As critical anthropol
ogists made clear, the Western concept of the individual self is a cultural
invention, and to presume the existence of mental concepts such as cognition
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and emotion in studying other cultures is a subtle form of imperialism. Fur
ther, as critics variously proposed (Wallach & Wallach 1983; Bellah et al.
1985; Sampson 2008), the primacy of the individual subject has injurious
consequences for Western culture itself. The placement of the psyche at the
center of human action lends itself to narcissism, instrumentalism, greed,
loneliness, callousness and implicitly a "war of all against all." The chal
lenge, however, is to generate an alternative vision of human functioning.
Perhaps the major impetus toward a micro-social theorizing - including
both communication and human functioning more generally - emerged
from the pivotal place of language in the development of constructionist
ideas. There was first of all Wittgenstein's (1953) replacement of the picture
theory of language with a use-based vision: The meaning of words arises in
their social use. Implicitly, the metaphor of the language game lends itself
to a micro-social analysis. Importantly, however, it is the game that takes
prominence and not the individual players. Resonating with Wittgenstein's
vision, writers in the Bakhtin circle (Bakhtin 1981) pointed to dialogue - as
opposed to mental functioning - as the primary source of meaning. Most
importantly, dialogue is conceptualized as a super-individual process. It
cannot be performed by a single individual alone. One may thus view re
lational process as a logical prior to individual functioning. Until there is
dialogue, one cannot speak meaningfully of an individual or a self.
These intellectual currents flowed together in what may be viewed as a
conceptual innovation of major proportion. In the social sciences, descrip
tion and explanation have been dominated by a logic of separable units stimulus, response, the individual, the group, the institution and so on. The
relationship between the units has remained problematic, with cause and
effect the most widely embraced solution. In contrast, implicit in the met
aphors of the language game and the dialogue is the end of entification, or
the fundamental separation of units. Rather, we move from "things in them
selves" to relational process. "This" is only "this" by virtue of its relationship
to "that" and vice versa.
In sociology, one could begin to sense the potential of this shift in the
early writings of Garfinkel (1967) and colleagues in the ethnomethodology
movement. A "suicide" could only be such, for example, by virtue of a social
negotiation. As discourse analysts further began to document, one could
illuminate the process of negotiation solely with reference to the discursive
moves of the participants. Recourse to subjectivity or "meanings in the head"
was unnecessary. Such post-structural arguments are extended in Gergen's
(2009) writing on "relational being." As first argued, discourse about the
mind originates within a relational or dialogic process, and its chief func
tion is serving the relational process itself. That is, such discourse functions
pragmatically in steering the direction of relational action. In this context,
Potter and Wetherell (1987) take "attitudes" out of the head and focus on
the positions people take up in discursive relations; Billig (1996) proposes
that reasoning is essentially an exercise in rhetoric, and a variety of scholars
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have explored memory as a social process (Middleton & Edwards 1990). As
Gergen (2009) further proposes, mental discourse is a constituent of bodily
performances, and these performances are embedded with larger interac
tion scenarios. Thus, for example, anger is a culturally scripted pattern of
action and embedded within a more or less routine scenario in which others
participate. On this account, emotions are not possessions of individuals,
but of a relational process. From this position, it is a short step to under
standing all meaningful action as originating within, and sustained (or not)
within a relational process.9
This line of theorizing resonates also with a range of writings on practice
theory (Nicolini 2012; Raelin 2016). Practice theory, like constructionism
more generally, is not so much a unitary theory as a dialogue among theo
rists. Central to much of practice theory is the assumption of interlocking
actions or performances. At the same time, such theory also recognizes the
place of material settings, objects, technologies and the like within the in
terlocking array. Thus, we move from a specifically micro-social realm into
a more holistic conception of a relational process. As Buddhist philosophers
might put it, we arrive at a consciousness of codependent origination.

Coda: reconstructing constrnctionism
In retrospect, I must again underscore the way in which the present account
itself emerges from a social process. The account is neither a map nor a
mirror, but an entry into a continuing reflection on our trajectory through
time, its significance and potential. But writing now from a relational per
spective, we can also see the way in which Berger and Ludemann constitute
what Derrida would call an "absent presence." The specifics of their initial
formulation may no longer drive our scholarly dialogues, but traces of their
work pervade and inform these various developments. They offered to the
scholarly community a rich discursive structure, but ultimately they are not
in control of its meaning. As scholars, we have "run away with it," and fu
ture scholars will, as Wittgenstein would put it, take our own writings "on a
holiday." This inability to control our meaning is not a failing of any kind,
but a recognition that it is only together that we keep meaning alive.

Notes
In addition to the common (though inconsistent) conflating of constructionism
and constructivism, one may wish to contrast a variety of understandings and
interpretations of social construction: for example, Hacking (1999), Best and
Harris (2012), Gergen (1994a), Heiner (2015), Shatter (2010) and Lock and Strong
(2012).
2 As Berger and Luckmann note in their Introduction, their work deviates from
the mainstream sociological interests of the times.
3 Should targets of critique defend themselves, they ran the risk of seeming simply
to be protecting self-interest. The one argument left to them was essentially that
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employed by the critic, to wit, the critique itself was ideologically or politically
motivated.
Interestingly, Adorno (1985) had criticized Mannheim for not being able to ap
ply his own theory of knowledge to himself. Much the same critique now applies
to the Berger and Luckmann proposals.
For a broad review of research stimulated by social constructionist ideas, see
Holstein and Gubrium (2008).
Berger and Ludemann confront an additional problem in proposing a rela
tionship between society and subjectivity. Remove society, and there is no sub
jectivity; remove all subjectivity and there is no society. The two are essential
redefinitions of each other.
In more recent years, relational theorists such as Mitchell (1988) and Aron &
Harris (2011) abandoned the search for truth in psychoanalysis and centered
their concerns on the interdependence of the analyst and analysand in con
structing reality.
Also at hand were the more mystical writings of Martin Buber (1923) and Vygot
sky's (1978) illumination of relational learning.
While not constructionist in their origins, the participatory ontology of Wester
man ( Westerman & Steen, 2007), Slife's relational ontology (2004) and Hermans'
dialogical self-theory (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010) all lend themselves
to this more radical form of relational theory.
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